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This study of appellate advocacy examines factors that affect judicial treatment of precedents 
identified in litigant briefs.  Although we find some attorney and party characteristics influence 
whether a court addresses precedent cited by a party, legal resources are not as influential in 
determining whether the court adopts a party’s use of a precedent. At times, ideological 
congruence between the circuit panel and the litigant can increase the likelihood that the court’s 
opinion will use a precedent in the same way as presented by the litigants.  There is also some 
support for the importance of attorney experience.  Even when their clients ultimately win the 
case, attorneys with no experience before the circuit are less likely to see the court use litigant-
cited precedents in a similar way to the party brief.  Even when their clients lose, there is some 
support to show that attorneys with more experience are more likely to see the court’s opinion 
address the precedents the attorneys have raised positively.  This suggests that attorney 








The Value of Precedent:  
Attorney Briefs and Judicial Opinions in the U.S. Courts of Appeals 
 
This study analyzes appellate advocates’ role in shaping judicial opinions in the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals.  Drawing from prior research that suggests stronger parties and expert counsel are more 
likely to prevail in case outcomes before the lower federal appellate courts, we focus on judicial 
decisions to use precedents raised in the appellate briefs.  Our analysis draws on original data to 
compare legal “inputs” by attorneys with legal “outputs” by judges.  By examining precedents 
used in litigant briefs and the courts’ use of or indifference to those precedents, we can further 
evaluate the role of parties and their attorneys in providing pertinent information and influencing 
court decisions.     
 First, we discuss the role that litigants and their counsel have in framing the issues on 
appeal and the particular importance of appellate briefs in the U.S. Courts of Appeals.  Next, we 
discuss how parties and judges use precedent.  Building on these foundations, we then examine 
variation in judicial treatment of litigant-identified precedents and test our expectations using 
appellate briefs and majority opinions from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.  
After evaluating the informational role of appellate advocacy, we assess factors that determine 
litigant success in persuading courts to use precedents in a manner that is consistent with the 
position adopted in the appellate brief.   Then we explore the potential linkages between 
winning, losing, and appellate advocacy. 
 
ISSUE FRAMING AND ARGUMENTS IN APPELLATE BRIEFS 
On appeal, attorneys have two possible mechanisms for persuading judges:  written briefs and 




when oral argument is granted, it typically builds on arguments presented in the briefs.1  
Consequently, judges largely rely on attorneys’ written arguments as a basis for evaluating the 
dispute before them (Michel, 1998).2  Courts themselves stress the importance of the briefs 
relative to oral arguments.  For example, in an instructional handbook provided to attorneys, the 
Seventh Circuit emphasizes that briefs are “the first step in persuasion, as well as being by far the 
more important step” and “should contain all that the judges will want to know, including 
references to anything other than the briefs that may have to be consulted in the record or in the 
precedents” (Practitioner’s Handbook, 2003:71-75).  In this way, each party presents its own 
picture of the dispute, which it attempts to shape to its best advantage, largely through the use of 
influential prior cases.3 
As specified by the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure as well as circuit rules, 
attorneys must follow a highly standardized format for the written briefs that includes detailed 
instructions on the sequence with which parties must file their briefs, as well as the order of the 
content within each document.  These rules dictate that the appellant must be the first to file a 
brief that reviews the facts of the case, identifies the central legal issues of the claim, and then 
elaborates upon those issues.  Typically, the respondent brief then uses the issues identified by 
the appellant as a baseline and modifies or reframes them in a way favorable to the respondent’s 
position.  The respondent also has the ability to raise issues that are not discussed by the 
appellant.  Finally, the appellant may file a reply brief to counter any new arguments raised by 
the respondent or to attempt to distinguish precedents used by the respondent.   
The extent to which judges accept the arguments put forth by one party (rather than by 
the other) can be influenced by the way in which attorneys couch the issues at stake.  Attorneys 




the light most favorable to their client, and second, by selectively using favorable precedent and 
legal authorities to explicate their position in the “Argument” section of the brief (Haire and 
Moyer, 2008:596).   
One recent study on the Supreme Court tested this linkage, using plagiarism software to 
identify when language from litigant briefs was used in Supreme Court opinions.  Attorney 
experience, ideological compatibility, and elite cues (specifically, Washington attorneys and the 
solicitor general) all increased the likelihood that a Supreme Court opinion would directly 
borrow from a party’s brief (Corley, 2008).  The notion that judges respond to the reputation of 
the source has additional support in research on political persuasion, suggesting that the 
likelihood of a cue being well received by the “listener” depends in large part on a listener’s 
perceptions of the “speaker.”  In order to be convincing, the speaker must build a relationship of 
trust so that the listener will view the speaker as a credible source of information (Lupia, 2002).  
Applied to this context, a judge’s assessment of an issue frame, including the argument and 
precedents used to support that argument, may vary with his or her perceptions of those who 
have presented these arguments in the appellate brief.  
 
ARGUMENTS, REASONING, AND PRECEDENT 
Counsel’s ability to persuade a panel of judges often hinges on their use of relevant legal 
authorities, including precedent.  The use of precedent in legal decision making reflects what is 
often referred to as analogical reasoning:  to resolve a given dispute, a decision maker should 
look to similar disputes that have been resolved in the past, determine the rule established by the 
past decisions, and apply that rule to the current circumstances.  Analogical reasoning through 




However, not all precedents are created equal.  In the context of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 
judges must contend with several sources of precedent, some of which are binding, and some of 
which may be considered persuasive or advisory (Johns and Perschbacher, 2007:110-11).  While 
all circuits are bound by Supreme Court precedent, each circuit develops its own body of law 
that is binding within that circuit but not within others.4 Aside from territorial factors and judicial 
hierarchy considerations that limit the applicability of precedents, scholars have used a variety of 
measures to show that the relative strength and importance of individual precedents often wax or 
wane over time (Hansford and Spriggs, 2006; Biskupic and Witt, 1997; Cook, 1993).  More 
recently, judicial scholars have begun to examine the psychological processes that underlie legal 
decision making (Braman, 2006; Furgeson, Babcock, and Shane, 2008) and, specifically, the use 
of precedent.  Braman and Nelson (2007) find evidence that legal decision makers vary 
somewhat in their judgments about the relative similarity of two cases. 
To understand how specific precedents ultimately make their way into the court’s 
opinion, it is important to move beyond a focus on case outcomes and, alternatively, compare the 
use and treatment of precedent from attorneys’ briefs with that in the court’s opinion. We 
develop our analysis in three distinct parts, each representing a different perspective on 
understanding court use of precedent identified in the litigants’ briefs.  The first analysis 
examines whether the court’s opinion addresses the precedent cited by the attorney in any way.  
This perspective emphasizes the informational role played by litigants and their counsel, 
focusing on whether the court used the precedent cited by the party, regardless of how the court 
chooses to employ the prior case.  In the second analysis, we test for factors that affect litigant 
success by modeling whether the court uses the precedent in a manner that is congruent with a 




with respect to case outcomes.  In this respect, we examine how the ability of litigants to 
persuade a court to adopt their use of precedent is tied to winning and losing. 
The Informational Role of Appellate Advocacy.  Appellate briefs are expected to 
provide courts with all relevant information needed to render a judgment.  As noted by one 
prominent appeals court jurist, “judges labor under the immense disadvantage of having very 
little time to spend on each case . . . the judges are badly in need of the advocate’s help” (Posner, 
2008:220).  In transforming the case from the trial posture to one focused on appellate review, 
counsel frame the issues and construct arguments designed to persuade the judges to rule in their 
favor.  As part of that process, advocates identify those legal authorities, including precedents 
that are central to their arguments.  By identifying and discussing precedents in their briefs, 
advocates play an important informational role.  The parameters of those efforts are defined by 
the actions of the court below, with advocates representing appellants searching for reversible 
legal errors made by the trial judge and advocates representing respondents arguing in support of 
the status quo.   
The search for legal authorities may begin with trial court decisions that use precedents to 
develop the rationale for the disposition; however, the actions of the trial court (or administrative 
judge) are often not framed for appellate review.5  Several examples may help illuminate the 
distinction between the trial and appellate levels.  For instance,  a plaintiff may appeal a 
summary judgment decision that is largely an account of the facts yielded from discovery.  Or a 
litigant who lost in a jury trial might focus his appeal on jury instructions or the trial court 
judge’s rulings on admissibility of evidence.  In some situations, there may not even be a trial 
court decision, such as when a case is a direct appeal from an administrative agency decision.  




but the expectations of the appellate advocate are constant.  Advocates are expected to place the 
alleged errors by the lower court in the appellate context.  As part of that effort, they provide 
information to the court on relevant precedents.  Here, we evaluate this aspect of their 
informational role through a model in which the dependent variable is coded simply as whether 
or not the court cited a precedent used by the brief writer. 
One would expect the degree to which a brief effectively provides courts with 
information on the relevant precedents to vary with the abilities of the appellate advocate.  In 
recent extensions of party capability theory (Galanter, 1974), scholars have found attorneys with 
substantial experience and expertise exercise more influence on the content of the court’s 
opinion (Haire, Lindquist, and Hartley, 1999; Szmer, Johnson, and Saver, 2007).  Here, we 
expect that as the expertise and the experience level of the brief writer increase, the likelihood of 
the court addressing that precedent will also increase.  We also expect that other resources, 
including those associated with the size of the legal team, will affect the likelihood of court 
citation to the precedent.  Past studies have suggested that as the number of attorneys on a party’s 
litigation team increases, that party’s chances of success also increase (Szmer, Johnson, and 
Sarver, 2007).  Further, the presence of multiple firms may be influential (Wheeler et al., 1987).  
Legal firms generally possess legal resources that go beyond the number of attorneys, such as 
higher numbers of legal assistants, interns, extensive law libraries, and access to on-line 
resources.  Firms that specialize in appellate practice also may possess more procedural expertise 
at the appellate level and, thus, may be more persuasive in identifying relevant precedents for the 
circuit court.   
In addition to being represented by more experienced, expert counsel, repeat-player 




value to the court than those used by individuals, particularly prisoners.  One-shot litigants 
(individuals), motivated by their immediate interest in the case outcome at hand, will be less 
selective when identifying relevant precedents than institutional litigants who “play for the 
rules.”  
Judges may also be more likely to cite those precedents that are consistent with norms 
surrounding horizontal and vertical stare decisis.  By grounding an opinion in the law of the 
circuit or the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, a judge will enhance the legitimacy of that 
decision.  Older cases may also lack the salience and influence of more recent precedents 
(Hansford and Spriggs, 2006).  Further, we would not expect a court to comment on each 
precedent used by counsel.  One would expect that judicial attention to a precedent is more likely 
when the brief writer does not attempt to cite every possible case, whether highly relevant or not, 
and chooses instead to focus the argument on a limited number of precedents.6  For this reason, 
we expect that as more cases are cited within a brief, the likelihood of the court addressing any 
single case from that brief should decrease.  However, if both sides cite a particular case, this 
may be an important signal to the court of a case’s importance, or at least an indication of the 
need to recognize a precedent.  Finally, one would expect that judicial attention to precedents 
will  vary with the salience of the legal policy area.  
Data and Measures for Informational Models.  Our analysis focuses on advocacy and 
decisions from a single circuit: the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.  At the 
inception of this project, this appeals court was the only circuit that maintained free electronic 
access to parties’ briefs and opinions for civil (but not criminal) cases on its public Web site 
(www.ca7.uscourts.gov).  Although the single-circuit focus is a limitation on generalizability, 




The data-collection process occurred in several stages.  First, we used a systematic 
sampling design to identify a random sample of published civil cases from 2005 to 2007 from the 
Seventh Circuit.  Second, we downloaded the court opinions, the appellant briefs, and the 
respondent briefs.  This process yielded 86 cases and 172 briefs for the analysis, which 
represented 10 percent of the universe of cases.8  Third, we identified each precedent used in the 
appellants’ and respondents’ briefs considered to be a “strong citation” as used by the parties.  A 
citation was deemed to be “strong” if the author specifically named a precedent in its discussion 
or quotes from the text of the opinion.  Strong citations by brief writers included those that were 
positive as well as those that were negative.  String citations used by the parties in their briefs 
were not included in the analyses.9  This resulted in 814 precedents used in our sample of cases.  
Fourth, we analyzed the majority opinion, recording whether the court acknowledged the 
precedent in any way or ignored the cited case altogether.10  Fifth, if the citation was 
acknowledged in the opinion, we looked to see how the precedent was used by the court.  We 
coded these precedents in the court’s opinion as one of the following categories: ignored, 
positive, negative, or cited in a string.   
In the informational model, the dependent variable was coded as a 1 if the court 
mentioned the litigant-identified precedent at all and as a 0 if the precedent was ignored by the 
court in the opinion.  While “mentions” include a wide range of court use (negative, positive, 
cites in a string of cases), the implications of not mentioning a litigant-identified precedent were 
clear:  the court did not consider it to be relevant.  As previously noted, adversaries at the 
briefing stage follow a sequential process whereby the appellant’s brief establishes the initial 
issue agenda, including the identification of a set of relevant precedents.  For that reason, as well 




separate the observations by litigant status, modeling those used by appellants (n=402) separately 
from respondents (n=412).  Respondents, who must react to appellants’ arguments, will decide 
which precedents to use from their opponent’s brief and may include other precedents that 
support their position.  Recognizing that a respondent’s use of precedent may be different when 
the goal is to counter the appellant’s discussion of precedents (that are favorable to the 
appellant’s position), we estimated another model of respondents’ unique precedents that 
excludes those that were initially discussed by appellants (n=285).   
As we discuss more fully below, the deference given by the appellate panel to the court 
below, the sequential process of appellate advocacy, and the different goals of opposing litigants   
should contribute to differential effects that vary by litigant status.  For example, inexperienced 
advocates representing appellants may be doubly disadvantaged because they are less skillful at 
selecting a potential “winner” when deciding to appeal, while also lacking expertise in crafting 
persuasive appellate briefs for the circuit court.  In contrast, inexperienced advocates 
representing respondents should not fare as poorly (compared to inexperienced appellants) as 
they are in the easier position of supporting the status quo.   
 Our primary independent variables required the collection of multiple measures of 
attorney, firm, and litigant characteristics.  To evaluate experience levels, we follow previous 
studies that use attorneys’ prior court appearances that have been used in past research 
(Flemming and Krutz, 2002; Haire, Lindquist, and Hartley, 1999; Kritzer, 1998; McGuire, 1998, 
1995; Wahlbeck, 1997).  Although existing studies vary in the operationalization of this concept, 
a reasonable expectation would be that the number of times an attorney has appeared before a 
court should be related to their institutional knowledge and ability to identify precedents that 




Circuit as determined through Westlaw attorney-name searches.  We found wide variation in 
attorneys’ experience levels.11 Among appellants, approximately one-fifth of attorneys were 
making their “debut” before the Seventh Circuit, whereas close to 10 percent had over twenty 
previous appearances in cases decided by the circuit.  Attorneys representing respondents also 
demonstrated considerable variance:  22 percent were first timers, whereas 8 percent had been 
involved in twenty or more previous cases decided by the Seventh Circuit.  
Recognizing that the learning curve for appellate advocates may be steep (Haire, 
Lindquist, and Hartley, 1999) and that previous appearances before the court may vary widely 
within the legal team, we employed two indicators of experience.  In one, we created a 
dichotomous measure to distinguish litigants represented by counsel (including all on the legal 
team who were listed on the brief) who were appearing for the first time before the Seventh 
Circuit. In the other, we used the number of prior appearances for the first listed attorney on the 
brief (if there were multiple attorneys) as followed from prior studies (Wahlbeck, 1997).12  
Because of the skewed distribution of this measure (and the expectation that experience at high 
levels may lead to diminished returns), we used the natural log of lead attorney experience.13 The 
two attorney experience variables are moderately correlated at r = -.41. 
To determine whether the litigant was represented by a firm that specializes in appellate 
practice, we looked up each firm on Martindale Hubbell to identify the areas of practice for that 
firm.  The dummy variable for appellate-specialist firms is coded as a “1” if the firm listed 
appellate practice as an area of specialization and “0” if it did not.  In examining a litigant’s 
legal-team size, we also include measures for the total number of attorneys and law firms, if any, 




resources and repeat-player status, we created two dichotomous variables to flag briefs submitted 
by individual persons and prisoners.14 
We also constructed two dummy variables that indicated whether the precedent 
referenced in the appellate brief was from the Seventh Circuit (1= 7th Circuit, 0 = all other 
sources) or the U.S. Supreme Court (1= Supreme Court, 0 = all other sources).  Thus, a zero for 
both of these variables could indicate a precedent from a state court, a federal district court, or a 
different federal circuit.15  In addition, work on the Supreme Court suggests that the persuasive 
power of precedents will vary with its age, with its informational value decreasing over time 
(Landes and Posner, 1976; Kosma, 1998).  To account for this possibility, we follow Hansford 
and Spriggs (2006) by including two variables, both the age of the precedent (in years) and the 
age squared.  As a citation to the same precedent by both parties may provide a stronger 
indication of a precedent’s importance to the court, we also included a control indicating whether 
both parties cited a precedent.16  Finally, because the court’s treatment of precedent might vary 
across different case types, we included dummy variables for constitutional cases, prisoner cases, 
and civil-rights cases (with economic/other issues as the excluded category). 
Informational Model Results.  Brief writers for appellants and respondents used, on 
average, strong citations to four precedents in the development of their arguments.17  Table 1 
displays the results that predict the likelihood of the court’s opinion citing these litigant, strong-
cited precedents, excluding precedents associated with issues not addressed by the court.18  For 
both appellants and respondents, precedents raised in prisoner appeals were less likely to be 
identified by the court, while for appellants, precedents raised in constitutional cases were more 
likely to mentioned by the court.19  Appellants represented by “newcomer” litigation teams 




brief.  Interestingly, the measure of lead-attorney experience was associated with a reduced 
likelihood of court attention to a precedent for appellants, contrary to expectations.  This finding 
is robust regardless of how this measure is specified (e.g., lead attorney or attorney team, logged 
experience or total experience) and is not affected by removing the “newcomer” variable from 
the model (which, as noted earlier, is only moderately correlated with the continuous measure of 
attorney experience).  One possibility is that more difficult appeals tend to attract highly 
experienced attorneys who are especially aggressive in identifying precedents—and this high-
risk strategy is more likely to yield information on previous precedents that the court does not 
use in its decision-making process. 
[Table 1 about here] 
Our framework also suggested that counsel who had substantive legal expertise in 
appellate advocacy, as indicated by a firm’s self-reported specialization in appellate practice, 
would be more likely to use precedents that hold informational value for their judicial audience.  
The results for Model 1 in Table 1 offer support for this hypothesized effect.  For appellants, 
using a firm with a specialization in appellate practice increases the likelihood of court citation to 
their precedents from .16 to .26 (with all other variables held at their median values).  In contrast, 
access to other legal resources associated with the number of attorneys and firms did not affect 
judicial citations to precedents identified by appellants’ counsel.20 
The results for respondents (Models 2 and 3) portray a somewhat different story about the 
role of legal resources.  None of the variables that measure attorney experience and firm 
specialization show a statistically significant relationship to citation by the court.  While there is 
a strong, positive effect for number of attorneys in Model 3, the results for the number of firms is 




of the number of firms is significant but negatively related to citation by the court.21  Party 
capability theory continues to be supported, however.  Briefs submitted by individual-person 
respondents were less likely to identify and discuss precedents that were later cited by the court 
in its opinion when compared to those submitted by institutional respondents.     
The characteristics of the precedent also affected the likelihood of the court referencing 
that decision.  For appellants, a Supreme Court case discussed in the brief was twice as likely to 
be cited by the court than cases from any other court, all else equal.  Appellants using a decision 
from the Seventh Circuit increased the probability of citation from .16  for non-Seventh Circuit 
cases to .24.  Supreme Court precedents used by respondents were also more likely to be picked 
up by the court; however, respondents’ use of Seventh Circuit cases did not affect the likelihood 
of court citation to a statistically significant degree.  Although precedent age did not affect the 
likelihood of citation for appellants’ precedents, the results from one respondent model (Table 1, 
Model 2) show a weak, though not curvilinear effect that favors newer cases.   
As evidenced by the variable representing the effect associated with the total number of 
precedents cited in a brief, the “scattershot” approach to identifying as many precedents as 
possible does not affect the likelihood of court citation; however, precedents discussed by 
opponents were more likely to be cited by the court.  In the appellants’ model, if respondents 
also discussed the precedent, it increased probability of court citation from .16 to .41, holding all 
else equal.  For respondents’ precedents, the probability increased from .20 to .57 when 
appellants also discussed the case. 
Taken together, these results underscore the distinct positions of appellants and 
respondents in the appeals process, where the sequential process of filing briefs places more of 




matters for appellant attorneys; those that have not previously appeared before the court are 
statistically less likely to have their strong-cited precedents identified by the court, but firms 
specializing in appellate practice fair better than non-specialists.  As appellants are confronted 
with the burden of persuading the appeals court to overturn the district court decision, it makes 
sense that more experienced and expert attorneys representing appellants play a larger role in 
informing the court of noteworthy precedents than those that have never appeared before the 
court or do not specialize in appellate advocacy.  However, we also find support for “team” 
theories of litigation, where advocates on both sides play a role in providing information for the 
court.  When both sides identify the same precedent, the court appears to take notice and will 
also use that precedent in the majority opinion.  Yet all precedents are not created equal, as the 
Seventh Circuit is more likely to address a precedent when it is a decision from the U.S. 
Supreme Court or a case from its own circuits (at least for appellants).   
Appellate Advocacy and Success.  In this part of our analysis, we turn our attention to 
evaluating factors that affect the likelihood of a court agreeing with the brief writer’s use of 
precedent.  While “winning” and “losing” with respect to the outcome of a case clearly 
influences future cases, the breadth and actual language within the majority opinion establishes 
the relevant policies, scope, and legal principles that may be binding for decades into the future.  
Therefore, it is important to determine how the court uses the precedents raised by the party 
briefs, even outside of the particular outcome of who wins or loses.    
 Data and Measures for Success Models.  As before, our data are drawn from a random 
selection of civil cases between 2005 and 2007.  However, for this analysis, rather than 
examining mere recognition of the parties’ strong-cited precedents, we focus on precedents 




precedent in the same fashion as the parties.  To do this, we analyzed the majority opinions, 
recording the court’s acknowledgment of the parties’ strong-cited precedents.  If the court 
acknowledged a party’s strong-cited precedent, we then coded the precedent as one of the 
following categories based on the court’s use: positive, neutral, negative, or cited in a string.22  
We excluded observations where both briefs cited the same precedent, as well as observations in 
which the court ignored a brief writer’s precedent altogether, which leaves us with 69 
observations for appellants and 62 observations for respondents.   
For the “Success Models,” the dependent variables are coded in terms of whether or not 
the court’s citation to a litigant-identified precedent was at odds with how it was used by the 
brief writer (see Appendix B).  We coded a “win” for a litigant in terms of whether the court’s 
treatment of a precedent was congruent with the use of the precedent by the brief writer.  For 
example, if the brief writer uses the case positively (suggesting that a precedent is applicable and 
controlling in the present case) and the majority opinion also cites that precedent in a clearly 
positive way or relies on it in a string citation, then the dependent variable is coded as a 1 
(“win”).  Similarly, if the brief writer distinguished a case and the court also distinguished that 
case, this was coded as a “win.”  In contrast, a brief writer would consider it a “loss” if the court 
used the precedent in a way that was clearly different than the use in the brief.  In these 
instances, such as where a party uses a case positively in a strong citation and the court then used 
the precedent negatively (distinguished the case, overruled the case, or otherwise said it is not 
controlling), then the dependent variable is coded as a “loss,” or 0. 
The independent variables used for the success models are the same as those used in the 
informational models, with one addition.  We included a measure of ideological congruence to 




variable, we first created a dichotomous measure of panel preferences (0 = conservative, 1 = 
liberal) based on the ideological-median judge on the panel. Consistent with the coding of 
multiuser databases on judicial decision making (Songer, 1997), we examined the party 
matchups for each issue area and determined which party the panel would be most likely to 
favor, given their ideological preferences.  (For example, in an employment-discrimination case 
that paired an individual against a business, we assume that a liberal panel is more likely to favor 
the individual than the business.) The variable is coded as -1 if the party citing the precedent is 
not ideologically aligned with the panel’s preferences, 0 (if congruence could not be clearly 
ascertained), or 1 if the citing party was likely to be ideologically consistent with the panel’s 
preferences.23   
Our expectations for brief-writer success generally parallel those that emphasize the 
informational role played by parties and their counsel.  In addition, we expect that ideological 
congruence between the party and the panel will be positively related to success for both 
appellants and respondents. 
  [Table 2 about here] 
Success Model Results.  Among appellants, judicial receptivity to the brief’s use of 
precedent was affected only by the experience of counsel who submitted the brief.  In contrast to 
the findings reported for the informational models estimated in Table 1, the number of previous 
appearances (before the Seventh Circuit) by counsel for appellants increased the likelihood of the 
court supporting their use of precedent in the majority opinion.  For respondents, attorney-
experience levels did not increase the likelihood of judicial receptivity to the brief’s use of 




While our predictions related to the other characteristics of counsel were not borne out by 
the analysis, the likelihood of a brief writer and the court using a precedent in the same manner 
was affected by characteristics of the precedent, but only for respondents.  Binding precedents 
cited by respondents were more likely to be used in the same way by the court, as the variables 
for Supreme Court precedent and Seventh Circuit precedent indicate.  However, this was not the 
case for appellants.  This is expected given the different roles of the parties and burdens placed 
on appellants.  Respondents often have positive cases on their side, while appellants may seek to 
be more creative in attempting to sway the court into overturning the prior decision.     
Our expectations for ideological congruence were partially supported.  While ideological 
congruence between an appellant and the court was not a significant influence on a brief writer’s 
success, this variable was statistically significant for respondents.  Holding all other variables at 
their means (or modal values for dichotomous measures), the probability of success for a brief 
writer increased from .47 to .74 as the court and party became ideologically congruent.  This 
finding is significant because it suggests that the attorneys possess influence over not only case 
outcomes but also the substance of circuit opinions.   
 The Connections Between Case Disposition and Judicial Treatment of Precedents.  The 
findings from the first and second parts of our analysis offer mixed support for the view that 
legal resources, including experience of counsel, contribute to litigant success in persuading its 
judicial audience.  Although traditional perspectives on appellate advocacy emphasize the 
connection between arguments and success before the court, the disposition of the case may not 
adequately capture whether a litigant prevailed.  In this set of observations, 42 percent of 
precedents favorably recognized by the court were associated with unfavorable case outcomes 




terms of the contours of the opinion while losing the case outcome.  To explore this puzzle 
further, we examine factors that affect the court’s use of precedents among case winners and case 
losers.  
As in Table 2, we again reconfigured the data so that we had one list of all unique 
precedents; that is, precedents that were cited by both parties were excluded from this analysis.  
From there, we separated the observation set by whether the party advancing the precedent 
ultimately won (n=68) or lost (n=55) in terms of the case disposition.  Observations in which the 
case outcome did not indicate a clear win or loss and where the court ignored a precedent were 
omitted from the analysis.  We use the dependent variable from the success models (coded as 1 if 
the brief and the court opinion used the precedent in the same way, 0 if in opposing ways).  The 
independent variables, and our expectations for those variables, are the same as those used in the 
“success” models above, including controls for characteristics of the precedent, (age of 
precedent, identity of cited court) and the policy area (constitutional, civil rights).  Attorney 
experience is included in this model, again measured as the logged number of previous 
appearances for the lead attorney.  “Newcomers” were flagged, in addition to indicators of the 
total number of attorneys representing the loser, and whether the firm presented itself as 
specializing in appellate litigation.  We also add a dummy variable indicating whether the party 
advancing the precedent was the appellant or the respondent. Finally, we include a variable that 
captures the ideological predisposition of the panel to support the policy outcome.  Our 
expectation is that judges are more likely to agree with precedents advanced by a party when that 
party is seeking a policy consistent with the ideological preferences of the panel.  




The results in Table 3 paint a mixed picture about the ability of traits of counsel to affect 
opinion content. Among those who ultimately won their case, newcomer attorneys still fared 
poorly in having the court adopt their framing of precedent.  This suggests that even when first-
time attorneys win their cases, those victories may be due to factors outside of the attorneys’ 
skills in identifying and presenting persuasive precedents.  In contrast, as Model 2 displays, 
experienced attorneys representing losing parties were somewhat more likely to have their 
characterization of the precedent adopted by the court.  Thus, even when losing, more 
experienced attorneys may be able to shape the court’s opinion by the use of precedent.   
Interestingly, the size of the legal team and our appellate-specialization variables were 
negatively related to agreement on a precedent when the party lost the case and produced no 
statistically significant influence when the party won the case.  One possible reason for this 
finding may be that more difficult cases may draw larger and more specialized attorney teams.  
Perhaps another explanation could be that larger and more specialized litigation teams are more 
aggressive in framing cases that may not apply, at least in the court’s view.      
The source of the precedent provides some, but limited, explanations when examining 
winners and losers and the use of precedent.  Case winners have more success when citing 
precedent from the Supreme Court, though there was no effect for Seventh Circuit precedent.  
This was not true for those that lost the case, as the precedent’s source exhibited little influence.  
Ideological congruence is weakly significant and in the expected direction for case winners, 
suggesting that not only did they win the case, but also were more successful in shaping the 
opinion when they faced an ideologically friendly panel.  However, we find no evidence that the 
ideological preferences of the panel have any effect on the characterization of precedent for 




court’s opinion, potentially pointing to more aggressive behavior of the attorneys in these types 
of cases.   
DISCUSSION  
Our findings underscore the important informational role played by appellate advocates in their 
ability to shape the contours of the court’s opinion through the identification of relevant 
precedents.  As noted by Seventh Circuit judge Richard Posner:  “We call lawyers ‘officers of 
the court.’  And in truth lawyers assist judges in a variety of ways.  Judges rely on the lawyers in 
a case to develop the facts on which the court will base its decision, to identify legal issues for 
decision, and to do at least the basic legal research. . . . Yet at the same time that they rely 
heavily on lawyers, judges do not trust lawyers completely, or even very much” (Posner, 
1996:241).  
As this quote indicates, judges rely on counsel to establish the issue agenda and identify 
relevant case law; however, our results suggest that the informational value provided by 
appellants’ counsel varied with the expertise of the legal team.  Appellants represented by firms 
with a specialization in appellate practice were more likely to find that precedents discussed in 
their briefs were later cited.  Appellants represented by litigation teams with no experience in this 
forum fared poorly when attempting to call court attention to precedent.  Whereas increasing 
levels of experience were negatively associated with judicial attention to precedents, this same 
variable increased the likelihood of the court’s opinion treating the precedent in a manner 
consistent with the appellant’s use.  We speculated that highly experienced attorneys may be 
more aggressive in their identification of precedents, resulting in the low-information effect for 
cases identified by these lawyers.  This raises more potential questions and perhaps an interesting 




Among those precedents that are ultimately acknowledged by the court in the opinion, 
that acknowledgment is more likely to be a “win” when the precedent was advanced by 
experienced counsel for appellants.  This result may stem as a function of the sequential nature 
of the process and the burdens placed on the appellants.  As the default is to rule for the 
respondents, attorneys with less experience and skill representing respondents may nevertheless 
be successful.  However, for appellants who face difficult legal hurdles in winning their cases, 
more experience may lead to more influence through an ability to persuade the court concerning 
relevant precedents.   
Our analysis also revealed that certain factors influence whether the court treats a 
precedent the same way as the party regardless of whether litigants win or lose the case.  An 
attorney with no experience before the circuit court is less likely to persuade a court when 
framing precedents, even when the attorney’s client ends up winning the case.  Meanwhile, more 
experienced attorneys are able to succeed in getting the court to adopt their use of precedent 
when their clients lose.  Our results provide some support for the role of attorney experience and 
build upon this strong line of prior research.   
While we have no reason to believe that the Seventh Circuit represents a unique court 
with respect to appellate advocacy, we fully recognize the limitations of an analysis that focuses 
on a single circuit, as additional research is needed to evaluate whether these findings may be 
generalizable to other circuits over time.  Moreover, our reliance on an observation strategy that 
consists only of decisions with published opinions is another potential limitation, as judges may 
selectively use precedents as part of their effort to convince their “audience” that this decision is 
legally accurate and well reasoned.  Although some have suggested that non-published opinions 




have suggested that published decisions represent the major policy decisions of a court (e.g., 
Dolbeare, 1969).  The court’s own publication guidelines suggest that only unique legal or 
factual situations are worthy of publication.  Therefore, while not perfect, examining published 
opinions may serve as an acceptable practice for both theoretical and practical reasons.           
 Our findings regarding the informational role played by litigants support the notion that 
judges rely on appellate briefs to identify relevant precedents for the court.  Consistent with team 
theories of litigation, precedents that were more widely used by appellants and respondents 
garnered more attention from the court. Additional research will also be needed to explore the 
informational roles played by other actors, including law clerks, staff attorneys, and the trial 
court.  While very few cases in the circuit courts involve amicus curiae participation, interest 
group involvement may become a larger factor in the future as their participation in lower-court 
cases continues to increase.  Our findings regarding characteristics of precedents suggest that the 
effectiveness of appellate advocacy may vary with the precedential framework employed.  
Recent work at the Supreme Court level suggests that a party’s success in influencing court 
decisions also stems from whether a party uses existing interpretations and framing of cases and 
issues, or whether the party contextualizes the issue in a new or alternative framework 
(Wedeking, 2010). Moreover, the particular ideology of the opinion writer or the panel majority 
may influence which precedents judges select (Braman and Nelson, 2007), a conclusion that is at 
least partially supported by our findings.  Future research examining these issues could also be 
instructive on the connections between litigant “inputs” and judicial “outputs” in high workload 
courts, like the lower federal courts or state courts. 
 Despite the limitations discussed above, this project significantly adds to our 




availability of more extensive resources, such as the Seventh Circuit briefs used in this project, 
will undoubtedly assist scholars in using new methods to understand these complex situations.  
This project represents another step in that direction as future research will continue to unravel 






Table of Independent Variables 
Variable Coding Scheme 
Newcomer 
1=no attorney on legal team has previous 
appearances before the 7th Circuit 
0=at least one attorney has previous 
appearances before the 7th Circuit 
 
Attorney Experience 
Natural log of number of previous 
appearances by the lead attorney 
 
Appellate Specialist 
1 = Firm lists appellate specialty on 
Martindale Hubbard, 0 = otherwise 
 
Number of Attorneys 
Number of attorneys listed on the brief 
 
Number of Firms 
Number of firms listed on the brief  
 
Individual Litigant 
1 = individual litigant  
0 = all others  
 
Prisoner Appeal 
1 = appeal by prisoner  
0 = all others 
 
Constitutional Case 
1 = Appeal raises constitutional claim 
0 = all others 
 
Civil-Rights Case 
1= Appeal identified as a civil rights case 
(excluding prisoner appeals) 
0 = all others 
 
Supreme Court 
1 = precedent is from the U.S. Supreme Court 
0 = precedent stems from another source 
  
Seventh Circuit 
1= the precedent is from the Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals 
0 = precedent stems from another source 
  
Precedent Age 
Year the precedent was decided 
  
Precedent Age Squared 





Opponent also Used 
Precedent 
1 = if “strong cited” in brief submitting by 
opposing litigant 
0 = not strong cited in brief submitting by 
opposing litigant 
 
Total Precedents Used 
Number of total precedents listed in Table of 
Authorities of the party’s brief 
 
Ideological Congruence 
-1 = Party raising precedent and median panel 
preferences not ideologically aligned 
0 = Ideological congruence could not be 
determined 
1 = Party raising precedent and median panel 










Coding of Dependent Variable in “Success Models” 
 
Attorney’s Use of Precedent Court’s Use of Precedent Dependent 
Variable 
Coding 
Positive (applies/follows) Positive  
Win (1) Positive (applies/follows) String Cite 
Negative (distinguish/overrule) Negative  
   
Positive (applies/follows) Negative 
Loss (0) Negative (distinguish/overrule) Positive 
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Informational Role and Appellate Advocacy 
Logit Model—Likelihood of Judicial Citation to Precedents Identified in Briefs    










Only by Respondents 
Coefficient (RSE) 
Newcomer -.655*    
(.375) 
.538    
(.551) 
-.492    
(.804) 
Lead Attorney Experience -.548*    
(.115) 
.083    
(.170) 
.049    
(.166) 
Number of Firms -.075    
(.180) 
-.171    
(.183) 
-.609*    
(.314) 
Number of Attorneys 
 
.136   
(.103) 
.158    
(.097) 
.225***    
(.087) 
Firm with Specialization in 
Appellate Practice 
.652**    
(.253) 
-.425    
(.377) 
-.410    
(.358) 
Individual Litigant -.328    
(.262) 
-.672**     
(.337) 
-.999*    
(.585) 
Prisoner case -1.28***    
(.427) 
-2.26***   
(.437) 
-1.36***    
(.516) 
Supreme Court .825**    
(.339) 
1.58***    
(.372) 
1.73***    
(.578) 
Seventh Circuit .526*    
(.297) 
.209    
(.312) 
.329    
(.514) 
Precedent Age  .007    
(.016) 
-.041*    
(.021) 
-.033    
(.035) 
Precedent Age Squared -.000    
(.000) 
.000    
(.000) 
.000    
(.000) 
Total Precedents Used -.007    
(.008) 
.001   
(.007) 
-.001    
(.011) 
Opponent also Uses Precedent 1.34***    
(.267) 
1.66***    
(.332) 
------- 
Constitutional Case .536*    
(.289) 
.191    
(.483) 
-.178    
(.646) 
Civil-Rights Case .356      
(.291) 
-.038    
(.356) 
-.321    
(.463) 
Constant -.487    
(.492) 
-1.27*    
(.650) 
-.660    
(.790) 
Log Pseudo-Likelihood -217.75 -224.14 -141.73 
Pseudo R-Square .178 .157 .088 




Notes: Coefficients reported with robust standard errors are clustered by case. +p<.10,  *p <.05, **p <.01, 
*** p<.001(one tailed).  Model 3 includes precedents discussed in respondents’ briefs not previously 





Logit Model of Appellate Advocacy and Success  
Likelihood that Opinion Treatment of Precedent is Consistent with Brief Writer’s Use  
 Model 1:   
Appellants 





















Individual Litigant .554 
(1.048) 
--- 
































Log Pseudo-Likelihood -19.381 -23.028 
Pseudo R-Square .0275 .0277 
N 69 62 
Notes:  Coefficients reported with robust standard errors clustered by case. +p  <  .10. *p <.05, **p <.01, 
*** p<.001(one tailed).  Model 1 includes precedents discussed in appellants’ briefs that were not also 
discussed in respondents’ briefs; Model 2 includes precedents discussed in respondents’ briefs that had 
not been previously identified by appellants.  Collinearity prevented the inclusion of the variable 
“constitutional cases,” “prisoner case” in both models, and the use of “newcomer” and “individual 





Case Winners and Losers Logit Models - Likelihood of Congruence 




Case Winners   
Model 2: 
Case Losers 











Individual Litigant --- -1.067 
(2.165) 






































Log Pseudo-Likelihood -18.551 -14.877 
Pseudo-R2 .0247 .0460 
N 68 55 
Notes:  Coefficients reported with robust standard errors clustered by case. +p  <  .10. *p <.05, **p <.01, 
*** p<.001(one-tailed). Variables for “constitutional cases,” “prisoner appeals,” and “total number of 
firms” were dropped because of collinearity;  “individual litigant” was dropped from Model 1 and 







                                                          
1 While each circuit has its own rules about the conditions under which oral argument is 
necessary, the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure note that oral argument should not be 
granted if the appeal is frivolous, the dispositive issues have already been authoritatively 
decided, or if the facts and arguments in the brief and record provide a sufficient basis for the 
court to make a decision (F.R.A.P. 34(a)2.a-c).     
2 It should be noted that judges do not exclusively rely on the attorneys’ briefs to convey the 
legal arguments, as law clerks often prepare “bench memos” that summarize the arguments on 
both sides and provide some evaluation of their relative strengths (Cohen, 2002).  However, this 
practice is not uniform across circuits or judges, so it is difficult to generalize about the role that 
such memoranda play.  
3 It is possible for issues to be raised and precedents discussed in oral arguments that are not 
presented in the briefs.  While this may occur at the Supreme Court level (Johnson, Wahlbeck, 
and Spriggs, 2006) it is a rare occurrence at the circuit-court level.  Unlike the Supreme Court, 
oral arguments at the circuit level often deal as much with the factual issues in the case as the 
legal justifications.  However, to explore the possibility that new precedents were raised in oral 
arguments, we listened to each oral argument from ten cases in our data (11 percent of our 
sample).  After listening to these oral arguments, we found no instances in which new precedents 
not found in the briefs were raised, and minimal mentions of any precedents at all.  The 
overwhelming majority of the discussions in these oral arguments dealt with the facts of the case 
or procedural issues, without reference to precedent.  For this reason, we limit the focus of the 
present study to precedents identified in the briefs and leave the examination of oral arguments at 




                                                                                                                                                                                           
4 Responsible for ensuring uniformity in federal law, the Supreme Court recognizes the 
importance of resolving conflicts between courts (see Rule 10).  Nevertheless, as McNollgast 
(1995) suggests, the high review costs associated with determining whether a lower court has 
followed the Court’s preferences would contribute to a high level of tolerance for doctrinal 
deviance.  One study found the average length of time that an intercircuit conflict persists prior 
to resolution before the Court was 8.2 years (Tiberi, 1993).   
5 To address the concern that our findings are affected by the absence of a control for the district 
court’s efforts in identifying relevant precedents, we sampled one-fourth of the cases (n = 22) in 
our dataset to examine more closely the effect of the trial court disposition.  Of the 22 cases in 
our sample, only 68 percent (15) had reasoned district court decisions, including four that were 
published in the federal supplement.  Those district court decisions that did not have a reasoned 
opinion involved challenges to attorney fee awards (n = 2), district court procedural rulings in a 
jury trial (n=2), administrative decisions from BIA (n = 2), and a district court ruling that briefly 
affirmed the decision of a bankruptcy court (n = 1).  Of the 15 “reasoned” decisions by district 
courts, the bulk of the discussion in each case was devoted to the court’s fact finding.  Seven of 
these 15 decisions discussed or included quotes from precedents with the other 8 decisions 
relying on string citations to support the trial court’s arguments. If a reasoned decision had been 
filed, we listed all precedents cited by the district court (including string citations, which made 
up 75 percent of the total).  Of the 119 precedents cited by district court judges, 78 percent were 
not acknowledged by the USCA in the panel’s majority opinion; 17 percent (n = 21) were listed 
by the USCA in string citations; the appeals court discussed or quoted language from precedents 




                                                                                                                                                                                           
27 district court-identified precedents that were ultimately acknowledged by the USCA.  None of 
the six precedents included in the trial court decision and later discussed by the USCA had 
escaped the attention of an appellate advocate.   Although further exploration of the role of the 
district court in shaping the appellate context merits further study, we believe that these 
observations suggest our assessment of judicial treatment of precedents identified by appellate 
advocates will not be affected by the failure to include precedents identified by trial courts. 
6 Likewise, arguing alternative strategies for one’s clients may entail using numerous precedents 
that the reviewing court finds unnecessary.  For example, attorneys will often argue that 
dismissal is needed based on a jurisdictional issue and, in the alternative, argue for their clients 
based on substantive matters, citing cases for both the jurisdictional and substantive issues.  A 
reviewing court may adopt the jurisdictional arguments and cite those precedents discussed on 
this point in the brief, but ignore precedents used by counsel concerning the substantive issues.  
For this reason, our analysis below only focuses on precedents raised in issues that are addressed 
by the appellate panel.  
7 We note that all circuits may have unique factors that limit the generalizability of examining 
any single circuit.  For example, the Seventh Circuit does not use “visiting judges,” and during 
this period had a slightly higher reversal rate and published a higher percentage of its opinions 
than other circuits (Fitzpatrick, 2008).  However, in other ways it is very similar to the remaining 
circuits.  For instance, the civilian population of the Seventh Circuit is near the average for all 
circuits, and the time to complete each case is near the nationwide average.  Fifty-five percent of 
appeals in the Seventh Circuit were criminal or prisoner appeals in 2007, as compared to the 




                                                                                                                                                                                           
this period (27 percent) is slightly lower than the national average for all circuits (40 percent).  
While one could argue that the Seventh is dominated by Illinois-area judges and attorneys, 
evidence suggests that this may not be that different than other circuits, such as the Second (New 
York), Fifth (Texas), Ninth (California), and the Eleventh (Florida) that also include a mixture of 
one very large state and other less populous states (Emrey and Wasby, 2008).  
8 Our data do not include the relatively rare, but important, cases heard by the circuit en banc.  
Given our focus on the role of litigant briefs in the decision-making process, the inclusion of en 
banc cases would have required a separate analysis that takes into account several earlier steps 
where litigants provide written input, including briefs filed in conjunction with the original 
panel.   
9 A strong citation to precedent takes the following form:  “A motorist who was shot by an off-
duty deputy sheriff was allowed to pursue his claim in Brown v. King, 328 Ill.App.3d 717, 767 
N.E.2d 357 (1st Dist. 2002).”  In contrast, a “string citation” does not elaborate on the specifics 
of a holding and is often one of several citations listed at the end of a statement:  “Post-arrest 
beatings are within the scope of a security guard’s employment. Argento v. Village of Melrose 
Park, 838 F.2d 1483, 1487-89 (7th Cir. 1988); see also Bryant v. Liuigni, 250 Ill.App.3d 303, 
619 N.E.2d 550 (1993); Coleman v. Smith, 814 F.2d 1142, 1149-50 (7th Cir. 1987).”  
10 For the court’s use of party-identified precedents, we included instances when the court used 
the precedents as a string citation.  We believe that judicial acknowledgment of a case in a 
footnote or string citation indicates that the case had some informational value to the decision-




                                                                                                                                                                                           
11 The median number of appearances was 4, with the inter-quartile range of 1 to 10 for 
appellants.  For respondents, the median number of appearances was 8.5, with the inter-quartile 
range of 3 to 15.  The minimum and maximum values for appellants was 0 and 109, respectively, 
while for respondents these were 0 and 193. 
12 We recognize that there may be multiple means of measuring attorney experience, including 
using the most experienced litigator’s number of appearances before a court (Flemming and 
Krutz, 2002) and the average number of prior appearances for all attorneys involved.  Research 
on case outcomes frequently evaluates the effect of attorney capability by using a measure that 
compares experience levels of opposing counsel.  Difference-based measures may be less useful, 
when focused on the informational role of counsel.   Moreover, the sequential process of 
submitting briefs results in respondents reacting to the precedents that are initially discussed by 
appellants.    
13 Following other scholars’ use of the experience measure (e.g., Johnson, Wahlbeck, and 
Spriggs, 2006), for the log of attorney experience when the attorney had no experience, we added 
a 1 to the natural log as the function is undefined at zero. 
14 We also modeled party capability as a series of dummy variables: individual, federal 
government, business, and other.  However, in this operationalization, the only variable to 
achieve significance was the individual dummy variable, so the substantive results mirror the 
ones presented here.   
15 We also explored whether state court cases deserved special treatment.  Few citations (13 




                                                                                                                                                                                           
within the Seventh Circuit (i.e., Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin).  Given the low relative 
number, we decided not to create a separate variable for state cases for the sake of parsimony. 
16 In alternative models (not shown), we included measures of case complexity in the 
“informational” analysis: the number of issues raised in the briefs, the page length of the briefs, 
and the presence of a consolidated case. Of these, only page length was significant and then only 
for respondents, indicating that longer briefs are negatively associated with citation of a given 
precedent.  The estimates for the other variables in the model were not significantly affected.   
17  While examining why some particular advocates prevail before Supreme Court, other scholars 
have considered whether difference in resources between adversaries account for patterns of 
litigant success (e.g., McGuire, 1995).  This makes theoretical sense in examining the Supreme 
Court as, with complete discretion in case selection, the roles of litigants are arguably less 
distinct.  Respondents may take a more active role in attempting to frame the issues, particularly 
given the theory of “aggressive grants” (Perry, 1991).  In the circuit courts, which have little 
discretionary control over the dockets, litigants’ roles as appellants or respondents are much 
more clearly defined by a sequential process.  Often, respondents merely react to the appellant’s 
arguments.  Given the arguably larger burdens on the appellants and heavier presumption that the 
respondent will be victorious at the circuit level, we chose to compare appellants to appellants 
and respondents to respondents in separate models.  This allows us to examine more nuanced 
differences in advocacy, rather than highlighting the predominant influence of litigant role 
orientations in the sequential process of submitting appellate briefs.  We do note that in the final 
part of our analysis, we pooled observations with litigant-identified precedents being the unit of 




                                                                                                                                                                                           
18 We also modeled the citation of precedent as a function of whether the court addressed the 
issue associated with that precedent, using a Heckman selection model.  However, because the 
rho fails to reach statistical significance, we can safely conclude that selection model and the 
prediction model are not positively correlated with each other, and selection bias is not 
producing incorrect coefficients.  For these reasons, we present the results of a logit analysis. 
19 The variables Individual Party and Prisoner Appeal were only weakly correlated (r = .1).   
20 We also tried modeling the relationship between party and attorney experience as a conditional 
one by including a multiplicative term in the three models.  The interaction was only statistically 
significant in the model with the subset of respondent precedents, but given the very small 
number of individuals in this set of observations (24 out of 296), the confidence intervals around 
the predicted probabilities are too large to make any meaningful comparisons between party 
types.   
21 This result cannot be attributed to collinearity, as the number of attorneys and number of firms 
is correlated only at r = .4 for these conditions.  
22 In coding the treatment of the precedent, we generally follow the framework used by Hansford 
and Spriggs (2006:44-45), who used Shepard’s Citations’ guidelines for coding positive and 
negative treatment. However, we include string cites used by the court, as these are generally 
supportive of the party’s use of these prior cases.  For example, in Barricks v. Eli Lilly, 481 F.3d 
556 (2007), the respondent, Eli Lilly, discussed at length the applicability of Radue v. Kimberly-
Clark Co., 291 F.3d 612 (2000) in the respondent’s brief.  However, the majority opinion simply 
noted, “We have frequently discussed the dangers of relying on raw data without further analysis 




                                                                                                                                                                                           
others, as supporting this principle (Barricks, 481 F.3d at 559).  While the opinion does not 
expound on the precedent, string cites such as these show that the attorneys have been successful 
in drawing attention to a precedent supporting their position. In examining cases in our sample, 
we did not find an instance of a court string cite that was at odds with how the parties’ brief used 
that cite, although we recognize that this is a possibility.  Additionally, limiting our observations 
to only strong citations by the court would preclude us from estimating a meaningful multivariate 
model because of the small N.          
23 We also included this control in other iterations of the informational model (not shown), but it 
was not statistically significant and did not affect results for any of the other variables.  
